September 1, 2014

Preparing for the Future: Brcko, Kabul, Baghdad, and Beyond in U.S.-India Relationship: Cross-sector Collaboration to Promote Sustainable Development (Contributing Author with Dr. Michael J. Frantantuono, Dr. David M. Sarcone and LTC John Colwell Jr.)

In the current era, initiatives that involve cross-sector collaboration—collaboration among participants representing government, military, for-profit, non-profit, citizen groups, and intergovernmental organizations—to tackle problems that defy easy solution are becoming more commonplace at all levels of society. Thus, there is an increasing need on the part of strategic leaders from all sectors to better understand the factors that contribute to the success of collaborative initiatives. Those insights are relevant to efforts to promote sustainable development, a matter of importance in the context of the U.S.-India strategic relationship.

January 1, 2013

Conventional Weapons, Arms Control, and Strategic Stability in Europe in Strategic Stability: Contending Operations (Contributing Author with Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson)

My first question on approaching this volume was, What is strategic stability, or What are the different meanings of strategic stability My second was, Is strategic stability always, usually, or seldom, a good thing My third was, When strategic stability is a good thing, how do we arrange to bring it about Is it a weapons result, a diplomatic result, or a result of a common understanding I was brought up on the stability of mutual deterrence, half a century ago, and it was not all that difficult to understand. The Gaither Committee of 1957 had, after 12 years of the nuclear era, finally identified that deterrence via threat of retaliation depended on the recognized ability of a retaliatory force to survive an attack intended to destroy it, and that the U.S. retaliatory force was not able to promise its own survival. The international conference on measures to safeguard against surprise attack brought five western nations to Washington in 1958, before moving to Geneva to meet the five eastern nations. It became clear that the problem of surprise attack was not merely that it was dastardly, or worse than an anticipated attack, but that it might be attractive to a nuclear enemy if the enemy thought it might catch unlaunched response forces and destroy them, especially if the nuclear enemy feared an imminent attack by those very forces. Albert Wohlstetter’s not yet published paper, Delicate Balance of Terror, circulated among the Washington conferees and had an immediate impact. Later published in Foreign Affairs January 1959, it became the decisive document contrasting delicate with stable. The stable terminology came from an elementary physics term, in which an equilibrium could be stable or unstable. A stable equilibrium was one that, if disturbed, could recover an unstable one, when disturbed, decomposed quickly. Balance was a synonym for equilibrium and delicate was a synonym for unstable. Wohlstetter’s document was convincing.

April 1, 2012

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO (Co-Author/Editor with Tom Nichols and Douglas Stuart)

NATO has been a “nuclear” alliance since its inception. Nuclear weapons have served the dual purpose of being part of NATO military planning as well as being central to the Alliance’s deterrence strategy. For over 4 decades, NATO allies sought to find conventional and nuclear forces, doctrines, and agreed strategies that linked the defense of Europe to that of the United States. Still, in light of the evolving security situation, the Alliance must now consider the role and future of tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). Two clear conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, in the more than 2 decades since the end of the Cold War, the problem itself—that is, the question of what to do with weapons designed in a previous century for the possibility of a World War III against a military alliance that no longer exists—is understudied, both inside and outside of government. Tactical weapons, although less awesome than their strategic siblings, carry significant security and political risks, and they have not received the attention that is commensurate to their importance. Second, it is clear that whatever the future of these arms, the status quo is unacceptable. It is past the time for NATO to make more resolute decisions, find a coherent strategy, and formulate more definite plans about its nuclear status. Consequently, decisions about the role of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and the associated supporting analysis are fundamental to the future identity of NATO. At the Lisbon Summit in Portugal in November 2010, the Alliance agreed to conduct the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). This effort is designed to answer these difficult questions prior to the upcoming NATO Summit in May 2012. The United States and its closest allies must define future threats and, in doing so, clarify NATO’s identity, purpose, and corresponding force requirements. So far, NATO remains a “nuclear alliance,” but it is increasingly hard to define what that means.

January 1, 2008

Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century

If America is to meet the multiple challenges of the 21st century, it is crucial that it develop a system that places the right people in the right places in government at the right moment. The nation critically needs civilian policy makers who can manage change and deal with the here and now. This monograph examines the development of career civilian leaders for strategic decision making in the national security policy process. Such development must include the recruitment of quality personnel, experiential learning through a series of positions of increasing responsibility, training for specific tasks or missions, and continuous education that considers both policy and process. Consequently, it requires people who are not only substantively qualified and knowledgeable regarding policy issues but who also possess the leadership abilities to direct large complex organizations. This analysis considers existing efforts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency CIA to develop civilian leaders and provides appropriate recommendations for each. It also outlines the changes required to existing personnel management systems and development programs to create an effective cadre of civilian national security professionals for the policy process. These three departments were selected because they have traditionally had the primary role in the development of foreign and defense policy. The key actions required in a counterinsurgency involve work we associate with civilian skill sets and even agencies -- but the uniformed military is often placed in the position of having to undertake such activities. Consequently, a rebalancing of roles between military and civilian leaders is required. This new security environment requires better qualified career civilian leaders to think in different patterns in order to accomplish these daunting tasks.

February 1, 2007

The Other Special Relationship: The United States and Australia at the Start of the 21st Century (Co-Author/Editor with Douglas T. Stuart, William Tow and Michael Wesley)

This volume summarizes the major findings of the conference participants over the last year. Beyond the thematic resemblance between this volume and the previous study of U.S.-UK relations,
another similarity is the importance of two events in determining London and Canberra’s relations with Washington. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) represent the first turning point. The British and Australian governments reacted similarly to these attacks—immediately identifying 9/11 as a transformative moment in international relations. But the Australian Prime Minister’s presence in Washington, DC, during the 9/11 terrorist attacks intensified the personal impact of the events, and within a few days his government had invoked the ANZUS Treaty to offer its full support to the United States. The second “big event” dominating both U.S.-UK relations and U.S.-Australia relations has been America’s management of the Global War on Terror and, in particular, its leadership of the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

January 1, 2006

U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century (Co-Author with Douglas T. Stuart)

Although there is widespread agreement that the United States is the world's most powerful country in military, economic, and diplomatic terms, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, there is little agreement as to how the rest of the world will react to America's lead. Theory has an even more difficult time explaining the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), especially its remarkable endurance over the past 6 decades. The U.S.-UK partnership flourished during World War II, deepened during the long twilight struggle with the Soviet Union, and has prospered further since the end of the Cold War. It is likely to survive any new challenges that may loom on the horizon.

July 2005

Iraq and the Chameleon of War in Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era (Contributing Author with Clark A. Murdock and Richard W. Weitz)

The world has changed substantially since the Goldwater-Nichols defense reforms of 1986, and even since the issuance of CSIS’ first Beyond Goldwater-Nichols report in early 2004. In preparing for Phase 2 of its Beyond Goldwater-Nichols effort, it was evident to the study team that the goals of Goldwater-Nichols could not be achieved by focusing exclusively on the Department of Defense or its implementation of BG-N Phase 1 recommendations. Those changes required a broader view of national security and in some cases a re-evaluation of Goldwater-Nichols itself.

This report brings the BG-N approach to bear on the entire U.S. national security structure. It proceeds from a number of overarching principles, but perhaps the most relevant is that in an era of fast-moving, unpredictable challenges, government should be more agile– that facilitating action is preferable to incentivizing inaction. Toward that end, the BG-N study team sought to eliminate redundancies that produce inefficiency and conflict, while assuring maximum alignment of authority and accountability, including clear political accountability to the public through the President and Congress.

April 8, 2002

The Role of Strategic Leaders in The Future of the Army Profession (Contributing Author with Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins)

Who are the future members of the Army profession and how is their competence to be certified to their client, the American people? This is a contemporary analysis of the Army profession, its knowledge and expertise, with conclusions and policy recommendations.

This book contains essays on various aspects of the Army profession--its leadership, ethics, and knowledge. Historical, political, and social perspectives are presented as well as case studies that focus on training and development of personnel. Article titles include: "Trust in the Military Profession," "The Role of Strategic Leaders for the Future Army Profession," and "Professional Leadership and Diversity in the Army.

2000

The Past as Prologue — CFE and European Security in Defence and Security for the 21st Century (Contributing Author with Peter Jenner and NATO Parliamentary Assembly)

1996

Forward in Will NATO go east?: the debate over enlarging the Atlantic Alliance (Contributing Author with David G. Haglund and Robert H. Dorff)

June 30, 1996

Conventional Arms Control and European Security

Colonel Jeffrey McCausland argues that arms control is a political activity and cannot be divorced from other aspects of a nation's security and foreign policy. The key to exploiting good arms-control procedures and building on the successes of the 1992 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the November 1995 Dayton Agreement is cooperation. To that end, the West should:

* forge an effective working relationship with Russia

* design a European security architecture that both resolves and prevents conflict

* maintain NATO unity at all cost.

Now is an ideal time for the West to reconsider the roles of existing conventional arms-control arrangements, as its security orientation shifts from collective defence towards collective security. As the nature of security relationships in Europe changes, so arms-control policy must adapt to become more concerned with qualitative aspects of conflict prevention. Conventional Arms Control and European Security stresses that any new proposals should encourage frank discussions with Russia; and that they should use the CFE and existing confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) as their main building blocks. Although not the complete answer to the problems of security in post-Cold War Europe, McCausland concludes that conventional arms control provides a flexible, powerful set of tools with which to confront them.

1996

Conventional Arms Control in Arms Control Toward the 21st Century (Contributing Author with Gregory J. Rattray)

Ranging from the U.S. and Europe to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, from conventional weapons to potential threats from outer space—and cyberspace—the authors thoroughly explore differing approaches to arms control, successes and failures thus far, and the likelihood of future agreements.

January 1, 1996

The Transatlantic Alliance on the Eve of the New Millennium (Contributing Author with Senzena Trifunovska)

Within these pages is a veritable banquet for those who savour the politics of international security. The reader is offered factual analysis, insight, new perspectives, revisited concepts, problem spotting and recipes for solutions. Academic observers from a dozen different countries in Eastern and Western Europe and on both sides of the Atlantic subject a large number of questions of topical interest in the security field to one or other of these forms of treatment. Their debate embraces reinforcement of the European pillar of the Alliance; adjustment of the balance of responsibilities between the two sides of the Atlantic; and shoring up the transatlantic partnership and perhaps broadening it into that elusive concept, a `transatlantic community', stretching into economic and other fields. They address the perceived security vacuum in parts of Central and Eastern Europe and discuss measures to build up greater confidence between former Cold War antagonists and ways of developing in them the habits of co-operation rather than counter-operation. They draw up architectural designs for the security of the twenty-first century and grapple with the conflict of ideas circulating about the Alliance's future and particularly about its future relationship with Russia. Isolationism, nationalism, multilateralism, realism, constructivism and other -isms are helpfully put into context. Renationalisation, denationalisation and identities in formation or in decline are also investigated.

February 15, 1995

The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?

The author examines the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CFE treaty with respect to the process of implementation to date and prospects for final implementation in November 1995. The author describes the basic points of the treaty and the danger posed by the ongoing disagreement between NATO and the Russian Federation over the limitations imposed by the treaty on Russian forces in the flank areas. He analyzes the positions of the primary NATO members, Russian Federation, and Ukraine, as well as the United States and places the treaty in the border context of Russian foreign policy and the future of conventional arms control.

November 1, 1993

Gulf Conflict—A Military Analysis

A military analysis of the lessons of the Gulf War with recommendations for future security in the region.

August 31, 1983

Conventional Deterrence (Contributing Author with John J. Mearsheimer)

Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939–1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare. Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional deterrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive" weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war.