The past few weeks have seen a flurry of events that are all related to the most vexing problem facing American policymakers. Should the United States pursue a policy of confrontation or managed competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? This is a central foreign policy, national security, and economic issue in the upcoming November election. It may also be the most difficult national security decision since American diplomat George Kennan formulated a policy of “containment” to deal with the Soviet Union at the onset of the Cold War.
After President Biden’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in November, both China and the US appeared to acknowledge the importance of their relationship and sought at least a plateau to avoid further tensions. But finding that new “plateau” and maintaining it has been a challenge. American attitudes towards the PRC have plummeted since 2019 when roughly 50% of Americans had a favorable attitude of China. Today, that favorability rating sits at about 20%.
On 26 April, Secretary of State Blinken made his second trip to China in the past year. He met not only with his counterpart, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi but also with President Xi. Many interpreted Xi’s willingness to host the Secretary of State as further indication that the Chinese desired a return to “normal” relations. Blinken used the opportunity with Xi to warn the Chinese against providing military assistance to Russia in support of the war in Ukraine, and he urged Beijing to halt its aggressive policies toward Taiwan and the South China Sea. Blinken also sought to convince them to reduce China’s export of cheap electric cars that undermined America’s increased production of similar vehicles. In response, President Xi reportedly told the secretary that the United States must avoid “zero-sum games” and “while each side can have its friends and partners, it should not target, oppose, or harm the other.” Xi’s statement was not overly aggressive, but it did demonstrate that little progress has been made on these contentious issues.
Blinken’s trip did result in further discussions on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and joint efforts to curb the export of chemical precursors for the production of fentanyl. And it seems to have been another step the Chinese have taken in recent months to re-examine their approach towards relations with the United States, but finding a “plateau” remains elusive. The Chinese were obviously aware that the United States Congress passed a military aid bill only a few days prior to Blinken’s arrival, which included $8 billion to counter Chinese efforts in the Indo Pacific region. Within that package was also a law that bans the App TikTok in the United States if its Chinese owner fails to divest the popular app over the next nine months. Shortly after Blinken’s departure from China President Biden also announced the US would quadruple tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles – pushing it from 25% to 100% – in a move designed to boost American manufacturing and jobs. “I’m determined that the future of electric vehicles be made in America by union workers. Period,” Biden said after the long-telegraphed move was made official.
Xi then traveled to Europe for his first visit in five years. The purpose of his trip was to improve China’s diplomatic and economic relations with the EU, and it was also aimed at promoting divisions between Europe and the United States. It was not an accident that Xi’s trip included a visit to Serbia on the 25th anniversary of a misdirected American airstrike during the Kosovo war that struck the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Xi was welcomed warmly, but there is little immediate evidence that his mission was successful.
At the same time, President Putin was inaugurated for his fifth six-year term followed by Victory Day in Russia. Xi returned to China to host Putin on 15 May. Putin’s visit – the first trip after his inauguration – was full of pageantry. The two leaders stressed the "no-limits" relationship between the two countries, but it also underscored Moscow’s increasing dependency on the Chinese. There is little to no doubt that China as well as Russia and Iran are either pursuing a strategy of “managed chaos” or – at a minimum – looking for opportunities to exploit geopolitical advantages as they arise. They are also challenging the international order established at the end of World War II, which ushered in US global leadership – though they would describe the current environment as American hegemony that must be countered and undermined.
Putin clearly articulated that in his remarks during his recent inauguration (7 May) and Russia’s Victory Day (9 May). Xi did so as well during his recent trip to France, Serbia, and Hungary. The war in Gaza, meanwhile, has served as an opportunity for both countries to describe the United States as hypocritical in its opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and “neocolonial” in its support for Israel. Furthermore, they have used every opportunity to exploit this in their dealings with the so-called BRIC countries and the global south.
The collapse in American attitudes towards China occurred in the aftermath of three events. First, the onset of the coronavirus that originated in Wuhan, China in late 2019, which some believe was part of a failed Chinese biological warfare effort. Second, the visit by then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in August 2022. And, finally, the downing of a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon that travelled over the United States in February 2023.
In their aftermath, American opposition to China has at times approached hysteria. Some have even argued that the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza are part of a concerted strategy by the Chinese against the United States with both Russia and Iran as willing clients. But it is highly unlikely Moscow and Tehran would accept a role as Chinese puppets, and improved relations between these three countries over the past few years are ultimately transactional.
China might support Russian aggression in Ukraine privately but has publicly tried to portray itself as a supporter of global peace. Beijing will buy oil and natural gas from Russia but only at discounted prices. At the same time, it has steadfastly avoided becoming totally dependent on Russian energy. Furthermore, the Chinese have a long memory. They remember that Russia only declared war on Japan two days after the bombing of Hiroshima at the end of World War II and immediately occupied a large territory known as Manchukuo that Japan had seized from China in 1932. This territory remains part of the Russian Federation. In a similar fashion, Iranians have not forgotten that the USSR occupied northern Iran in 1946 and is experiencing internal turmoil based on the death of its president.
Finally, the Chinese are wary of a war in the Middle East between the US and Iran. A major conflict would likely sever the oil and natural gas that flows through the Persian Gulf to China and remains critical to its economy. Iranian exports of crude oil grew by 50% last year to over 1.2 million barrels per day and the vast majority went to China. Beijing is also increasingly concerned by Houthi efforts to attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea, which functions as a critical trade route for goods travelling to Europe from China. But even if China is not a “puppet master” that is orchestrating a highly coordinated strategy to destroy the United States, Beijing clearly seeks to undermine American global leadership over time and is supported in this endeavor by both Moscow and Tehran. Consequently, the question for American policymakers remains – is it better to pursue direct confrontation with China or attempt to cooperate with Beijing?
Those who support “managed competition” point out the many global issues (climate change, North Korea, etc.) demand American and Chinese cooperation. Consequently, both sides seem to be trying to limit hostilities to address these problems. Over the past few months military dialogue between Beijing and Washington has resumed, and Secretary of Defense Austin recently spoke with his Chinese counterpart for the first time since November 2022. This is a matter of necessity as China continues the expansion of its strategic nuclear forces and is not a concession by one party to the other. Both sides clearly have an overriding interest in avoiding war by accident.
Others have argued that the United States should pursue a modified strategy of “containment” and describe the current relationship between Beijing and Washington as a “second Cold War.” But this is an imperfect comparison. There was never any real economic competition between the US and the USSR, as the Soviet economy was roughly the size of Belgium’s. China, meanwhile, is the largest foreign holder of American treasury bills, buys US debt to support the value of the dollar and remains a huge trading partner.
Trade between the two countries has contracted in the last few years, but in 2023 China still exported over $400 billion in goods to the US – and the United States exported nearly $150 billion to China. Washington may be able to “de-risk” the American economy from China, but it will be unable to “decouple” it. Similarly, Beijing realizes that its economic relations with the US and Europe are of critical importance and far larger than its economic ties with Russia. Some policymakers believe that conflict between the US and PRC is inevitable, and Washington should prepare accordingly. In similar fashion, there were those that recommended an American preemptive strike against the Soviet Union because they believed war was unavoidable. Fortunately, those recommendations were never acted upon.
A policy of direct confrontation could bring us to the so-called “Thucydides Trap” (named after the Greek author of the history of the Peloponnesian War). It argues that there is a natural discombobulation that occurs when a rising power (China) threatens to displace a ruling power (United States), and the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash or war inevitable. Thus, policymakers have a choice: either manage the rivalry or accept the inevitable.
China has enormous domestic challenges that will only become more difficult – demography, slow growth, climate, social conditions, etc. The threat posed by China is real, but it is important that American policymakers do not elevate the threat to something larger than it may be. For example, in the 1980’s some strategic analysts argued that war between the US and Japan was inevitable due to the dramatic rise in the Japanese economy – obviously that never occurred. Consequently, the US must confront China when necessary and pursue cooperation when it can. The United States must always remain cleareyed about our relations with Beijing, and aspects of the deterrent strategy articulated by George Kenan at the onset of the Cold War may be helpful. He argued that the US should avoid hysteria and seek to contain the Soviet Union until it collapsed due to its internal contradictions. And that is what turned out to have happened.