Some would find it welcome news that Saudi Arabia and Iran are planning to normalize diplomatic relations after seven years of estrangement following talks mediated by the Chinese. Tensions have always been high between these two regional powers in the Middle East. To hear that Saudi Arabia and Iran decided to turn down the temperature — even after Saudi Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman declared Iran’s supreme leader made “Hitler look good” — would appear to provide a measure of stability to a region that has been fraught with uncertainty and confrontations.
But it complicates the United States’ position in the Middle East, as it underscores the growing influence of Beijing in this vital region. While the Saudis are said to have kept the U.S. apprised of the situation, Washington played no direct role in the negotiations despite a yearslong effort to broker a peace agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel. U.S. officials have attempted to diminish the significance of the rapprochement negotiated by rival-turned-foe China. But the Chinese agreement goes beyond diplomatic relations and includes the revival of a security pact. Both sides further pledge not to attack each other (even through proxies), tone down their hostile media rhetoric and refrain from meddling in each other’s domestic affairs. But what are the broader geopolitical impacts? Who may gain and who may lose if in fact this is fully effected?
What Does the Agreement Deliver for Saudi Arabia and Iran?
Iran’s pledge to cease attacks against Saudi Arabia includes those initiated by Houthi rebels in Yemen that are backed by Tehran. The devastating cruise missile and drone attack against the Abqaiq oil facility in September of 2019 that was widely believed to have been engineered by Iran nearly brought the two nations to war.
This agreement could pave the way for a resolution of the war in Yemen that has been ongoing for almost a decade and resulted in one of the greatest ongoing humanitarian disasters on the planet. Iran and Saudi Arabia have backed opposing sides in the conflict. The Houthi rebels who are Shiite and backed by Iran have launched numerous missile attacks against Saudi Arabia. In response, the kingdom has suffered international condemnation for its unrelenting air campaign in support of the Yemeni government which has failed to result in victory. A truce has existed for nearly one year, and it is now hoped this will be extended. Many experts believe Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has sought a “graceful way” to bring this war to a conclusion.
The Crown Prince likely believes a reduction in tensions with his largest neighbor will serve to reduce his political isolation and encourage foreign investments in the kingdom, which is clearly a priority. His “Vision 2030” plan remains his primary focus and is designed to make Saudi Arabia a global hub for business and culture over the next decade. The Saudi government is bidding to host the World Expo in 2030, and this could not be realized if the war with Yemen continued and Houthi missiles were flying through the air.
While the agreement hints that Saudi Arabia is forging new ties with U.S. foes Iran and China, numerous experts have observed that the Saudis still “think about security in English.” MBS likely will continue to look to Washington for protection, American weapons as well as security guarantees, but will use this recent aloofness as leverage against Washington.
Tehran is thinking similarly. The government has faced ongoing massive social protests since last fall and the apparent collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which reduced the threat of continued crushing Western economic sanctions . The Iranian economy remains in dire condition with rampant inflation and high unemployment particularly among the young.
Iran, it appears, is hoping to normalize relations with other actors in the region, including Bahrain and Egypt — it already resumed relations with the United Arab Emirates last year. But it also faces international criticism for providing weapons to Russia to aid its invasion of Ukraine, its ongoing efforts to enrich uranium to develop nuclear weapons, domestic repression, and for escalating tensions with Israel. On the global stage, all these items serve as an indictment of the Iranian regime.
The agreement could help Tehran break from international isolation while undermining the Americans’ position that Iran is a threat to global peace and security. Furthermore, the agreement does nothing to inhibit its ongoing development of conventional or nuclear weapons, despite Saudi concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.
As the JCPOA appears effectively dead, this agreement could encourage some aspect of Iranian temperance. The U.S. is the only country to withdraw from the nuclear deal, but it is important to acknowledge that Beijing is also a signatory along with Russia, Britain, France, and Germany. Despite apparent good relations between Beijing and Tehran, the Chinese are not interested in Iran becoming a nuclear power, and this agreement could push the Iranians to pump the brakes on their nuclear enrichment program.
Is the U.S. the Loser?
China enjoyed its status of peacemaker in the aftermath of the negotiations with its top diplomat Wang Yi calling the agreement “a victory for dialogue.” Beijing even received accolades from U.N. Secretary General António Guterres and others. In the immediate aftermath of the announcement, the White House claimed the agreement mirrored their blueprint that they’d initiated in 2021. U.S. Central Command Chief Gen. Michael Kurilla also attempted to pour cold water on Beijing’s efforts while testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee. “An agreement is not implementation,” he said.
But it is a concrete deliverable for the moment, which is more than the U.S. can boast about its recent dealings with Iran and/or Saudi Arabia. Many in Washington also admit that an end to the war in Yemen and a general lessening of tensions in the Middle East is a positive development. The UN estimated at the end of 2021 that over 377,000 people have died during the Yemeni war from violence, starvation, or disease.
An undercurrent of all this, however, is that relations between Riyadh and Washington have become strained over what the Saudis perceive to be a diminishment of the American security guarantee, the Biden administration’s criticism of the kingdom for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and its human rights record. The Biden administration was also clearly angered by MBS’s decision in November to cut oil production in an effort with Russia to keep crude oil prices high. The president believed that his “fist bump” visit with the Crown Prince during the summer of 2022 (which cost him a great deal of political capital) had cemented an agreement to maintain or increase oil production levels, which would have helped reduce inflationary pressures. The strain between Riyadh and Washington was underscored again with a recent announcement that OPEC (led by Saudi Arabia) would reduce daily production by nearly 1.7 million barrels.
Israel also has a reason to be considered the “loser” in the aftermath of this accord, as Tehran may view this agreement as a check on Israel’s growing influence in the region. The Biden administration was clearly attempting to broker a peace deal and the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, an attempt to mirror how several Arab states embraced ties with the Jewish state under the socalled Abraham Accords. Previously, experts in Washington thought this might result in a greater sharing of intelligence about Iran and even the creation of a so-called “Arab NATO” as a counter to growing Iranian power. Saudi Arabia appeared to show some interest in such a deal, but it insisted that Washington should provide expanded military assistance and greater access to nuclear power technology as a “sweetener.” With Tehran serving as Israel’s key foe in the region, it is hard to imagine that Jerusalem will be able to get past this agreement in any future negotiations with Saudi Arabia.
What has China Gained?
This is the first time Beijing has sought a major diplomatic role in the Middle East and suggests China seeks to assert its position as a major global power broker while also ensuring its ties to major oil producing states. But China wants to be seen as a global peace maker as it pursues its interests. This agreement comes after the China-Gulf Summit in December when Chinese President Xi traveled to Saudi Arabia. Xi’s recent trip to Russia cemented closer Chinese-Russia ties, though with Beijing in the superior position. It was described as “a journey of peace” by Beijing and occurred only a few weeks after China announced a twelve-point peace proposal to end the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine — though Ukraine has balked at the proposal.
China has been building closer economic ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia for several years. Both are now major oil suppliers to the world’s second largest economy and peace between these two regional powers would ensure that energy supplies are not disrupted in future. Beijing has become the major buyer of Iranian crude oil since Washington withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018.
Experts believe it could result in a realignment in the region that empowers China to a newfound position of influence and status. This would be a major diplomatic success for China. But there are numerous reasons for skepticism. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been enemies for decades underscored by religious and historic enmity. It has been several weeks since the signing of the agreement, which called for the reopening of embassies in both capitals within two months and a meeting of the countries’ foreign ministers to finalize details. It will be interesting to see if this occurs along the agreed timeline in a region that is notorious for delays or if it confirms that frequently “an agreement is not implementation.”