In 1972, Richard Nixon famously stood atop the Great Wall amid a whirlwind tour through three of China’s major cities. His visit stabilized relations between China and the U.S. for the first time since the Communist Party seized power in 1949. The visit, which symbolized a rapprochement between the United States and China, significantly shifted the international order and arguably ended the Cold War in East Asia. It was not just an illustration of that shift, however. The meetings were substantive — “a week that changed the world,” some said — and led to the Shanghai Communique, and its ambiguity regarding the status of Taiwan that continues to influence American policy.
More than 50 years later, the Biden administration is looking for that kind of success as it sends senior officials and cabinet members to meet their Chinese counterparts in recent months. Despite efforts by the White House to cool tensions between the two countries, relations are at their lowest point since Nixon’s visit. Clearly, U.S.-Chinese relations are at a crossroads, and President Biden wants to find a plateau in the relationship, dampen tensions, and avoid a crisis — while still appearing tough to the electorate.
Biden’s desire to improve relations is hardly altruistic statecraft or misguided idealism. It is the most important effort the two countries can undertake. They are two of the globe’s greatest military superpowers and the two largest economies. Both are unable to ignore that reality, and this relationship will shape the international system throughout the 21st century.
But can China and the United States find that bottom line and halt this continuing downward spiral? Is it possible to avoid the “Thucydides trap” that argues conflict is inevitable between rising powers and established ones? As of now, those answers are unclear, and recent developments in China under President Xi Jinping make the situation murkier — though some might speculate about a few promising signs.
BIDEN’S DE-RISKING VS. CONGRESS’S DECOUPLING
Many in Congress have argued for a strategy that would seek to “decouple” the U.S. from China. The idea is to put the U.S. in a position where it is not economically or financially reliant on China. The PRC has repeatedly abused the U.S. by stealing intellectual property, spying on American industries, and disrupting existing supply chain which were exacerbated by Xi’s Covid lockdowns.
But this is a tall order, considering how interwoven American and Chinese economic interests have become, and it may not be achievable. American trade with China amounts to over $700 billion annually. The PRC is also the largest holder of American treasury bills and is in many ways the United States largest “banker.”
That is why the Biden administration has begun to speak about “de-risking” the U.S.- China relationship instead. He aims to limit Beijing’s access to advanced technologies and foreign investments in China that are deemed to pose security risks. This must be accomplished while maintaining American overall economic and financial interests.
China has similar motivations to improve relations, but it is frustrated by limitations imposed by what the PRC perceives as an “aging superpower.” Diplomatic efforts by Washington to revise Asian security architecture, which Beijing believes is a strategy of encirclement, is viewed as a direct challenge to Chinese security interests. Still both sides recognize that, unlike the great power dispute of the Cold War, they are mutually dependent. That inextricable link did not exist between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which chose a command economy at the cost of greater access to global markets — a path the Chinese Communist Party has avoided since the 1990s.
Beijing is also not helping to reduce tensions, as it continues actions that are contrary to American national security interests. Chinese leaders (to include President Xi) continue to argue that reunification with Taiwan is a core national interest, and the February spy balloon incident led to the cancellation of a scheduled trip to China by Secretary of State Blinken. The Chinese military air force buzzed an American reconnaissance plane, and one of its ships cut in front of U.S. destroyers transiting the Taiwan Straits. Beijing has also sought to hack American officials email accounts, invested in intelligence gathering facilities in Cuba, and two Navy servicemembers were recently arrested for spying for the PRC.
These actions have resulted in rising rancor in the Congress and bipartisan support for taking aggressive actions against China. There have been further calls for expanded military assistance to Taiwan and increasing overall U.S. defense spending. Members of the U.S. military have also been outspoken about preparing for a potential conflict with China, and policymaker continue efforts in the AsiaPacific region to expand American defense relationships with South Korea, Japan, Philippines, Australia, and India.
BIDEN’S CHINA DIPLOMACY
Despite these challenges, the Biden administration has redoubled its efforts, as it has become increasingly clear that “decoupling” from China could be devastating to the American economy.
Secretary Blinken’s trip to Beijing was rescheduled, which was the first high-level engagement between the two countries since Biden met Xi in November 2022. It was the first visit to China by an American Secretary of State since 2018.
Blinken’s goal was to open communications, discuss “important challenges, address misperceptions, and prevent miscalculation.” The secretary of state underscored U.S. concerns and sought areas of cooperation on transnational issues. But ultimately Blinken was testing the waters to see if there was a path to reduce tensions and set the stage for a meeting between Biden and Xi at the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation Summit scheduled for the fall.
During his visit, Blinken met with Chinese foreign minister for over four hours and had a 35-minute meeting with Xi. Senior Republicans criticized this, but it is interesting to note that both Bill Gates and Elon Musk had preceded Blinken to Beijing, and Gates met with Xi as well. In addition, recent trips by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger indicate a Chinese desire to influence or discuss U.S. policy interests with those they deem “pragmatists.”
While Blinken’s visit appears to have gone well overall, the Chinese refused to reinitiate military to military talks designed to avoid accidents or incidents. While the rationale for China’s refusal is unclear, some experts believe they may be waiting to see if they can extract even greater political concessions from Washington prior to recommencing such discussions. Others have suggested that Xi may not have absolute faith in his own military and wants to consolidate major decisions within the Party and its current leadership.
At the same time, China continues to walk a tightrope with respect to its policies towards the Ukraine war. At times Beijing appears to be underscoring its close relationship with Russia and Vladimir Putin. For example, the Chinese military recently conducted naval exercises with the Russian Navy in the Sea of Japan and near U.S. waters in Alaska which created an uproar in Washington. At the same time, China dispatched representatives to the recent peace conference hosted by Saudi Arabia and sought to signal Beijing’s desire for a peaceful end to the conflict. The Chinese representative also met with National Security Adviser Sullivan on the margins of this event.
This also comes amid several mysterious changes in key Chinese leadership positions. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang suddenly disappeared in late June. He had orchestrated the combative approach known as “wolf warrior diplomacy” that had worsened tensions between the two countries . Qin was a close Xi ally and had been swiftly promoted by the president, but there has been little explanation for his sudden departure. He was replaced by Wang Yi. Wang previously held the position of foreign minister but had been made director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee for Foreign Affairs. Secretary Blinken has now extended an invitation for Qin to visit the U.S. this fall.
In addition, President Xi announced sudden changes in the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, who oversee the ongoing expansion of the PRC’s strategic nuclear forces. The commander and senior political commissar were both fired over allegations of graft and corruption. A deputy commander has also disappeared, and there have been reports he committed suicide. Clearly this internal discord could stymie the Chinese president’s efforts to improve relations and may indicate even greater domestic troubles in future.
CHINA’S DOMESTIC REALITY
Xi clearly has an interest in ensuring that the economic, military, and political power remains centralized under him and the Chinese Communist Party. After all, he is a true believer: he clearly embraces Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which means he believes the collapse of the U.S. is inevitable. He also underwent a ”coronation” at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, which recognized him as leader of China for life and as the most powerful PRC leader since Mao Zedong.
But Xi faces major challenges at home, and domestic issues have troubled him for years. An adviser to President Barack Obama once observed that when the former president met with Xi, Obama would speak about global issues and Xi would talk about Chinese domestic problems. These issues have only grown for the Chinese leader since Obama left the White House
The Chinese economy has not recovered as quickly from the ravages of Covid that many economists had expected, and it has led to one of the first major financial blips for the country since it began an economic transformation in the 1990s. In July exports fell by 14.5% and imports by 12.4% — far worse than predicted and prices are falling raising fears of deflation. It is also experiencing a significant drop in home and commercial property values, and a reduction in consumer spending. These challenges are coupled with high unemployment for the younger generation, above 20% for those between 16 and 25, and underemployment for recent college graduates. All of this is occurring at the same time the nation’s population ages and shrinks.
In response, the government announced a series of policies to stimulate economic growth with mixed results and skepticism in the business community. Xi has also dispatched Chinese representatives to Europe to shore up trade relations with the EU, which is increasingly a critical market for Chinese exports. He has promised that China will soon return to rapid growth — as high as 5% GDP annually. But a fundamental question is looming – are China’s growing economic difficulties episodic or systemic based on changes in Chinese society and demography?
Still the security apparatus is pervasive and fully controlled by the party. As a result, there is little clear opposition remaining in China. Consequently, Xi may have time to deal with these internal challenges before domestic pressures bubble to the surface and force a change in his approach towards the West.
He may also hope that new political leadership in the White House or Congress after the 2024 election could focus America’s attention on domestic issues and lead to compromise on Taiwan and other security issues due to the close economic ties between the two countries.
Biden knows the deep suspicions both sides have about each other cannot be erased. He is also restrained by rising animosity towards China in the Congress and the impending start to the Presidential campaign in 2024. Issues such as Taiwan, American criticism of Beijing’s record on human rights, tariffs, access to advanced technology, the war in Ukraine, etc. will not disappear. Consequently, the possibility of a major compromise by either side is hard to envision in the short term.
Whatever the outcome, we must be clear-eyed that the relationship between the PRC and the United States remains critical for global peace and stability. How Washington and Beijing manage inevitable strategic competition while avoiding conflict is vital to both countries and global economic development. Mistrust will continue but resuming dialogue and diplomacy is far better than someday watching events uncontrollably escalate to war. This may be the most essential leadership task facing Mr. Biden and his successors.